Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation Back Into Style by Levine, Jack
Nova Law Review
Volume 8, Issue 2 1984 Article 2
Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing
Rehabilitation Back Into Style
Jack Levine∗
∗
Copyright c©1984 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing
Rehabilitation Back Into Style
Jack Levine
Abstract
As is the case nationwide, Florida is experiencing a philosophical
and fiscal tug-of-war over the issue of juvenile justice.
KEYWORDS: florida, rehabilitation, juvenile
Juvenile Justice in Florida: Bringing Rehabilitation
Back Into Style
Jack Levine*
I. Introduction
As is the case nationwide, Florida is experiencing a philosophical
and fiscal tug-of-war over the issue of juvenile justice. The continuous
struggle between rehabilitation and punishment has resulted in major
statutory revisions in four of the past five years. In budgetary terms,
the state is attempting to pay for both treatment and punishment and
this dual emphasis hampers the potential for rehabilitative success.
This article is written with a dual purpose: to dispel several juvenile
justice myths and to present a factual account of Florida's juvenile jus-
tice program as it currently exists. It is hoped that this information will
give elected officials and their concerned constituents the impetus to
improve the ways we handle young persons who get into trouble. Dur-
ing the decade of the 1970s Florida played a leadership role in national
juvenile justice reform, but our status as the model state is slipping.
Only if certain statutory and budgetary changes are made can Florida
reclaim its position as the exemplary provider of justice to children and
their families.
II. Juvenile Crime in Florida: Myths and Facts
In 1982, approximately 76,000 youths aged seventeen and under
were arrested in Florida-a decrease of twenty-one percent over the
past five years.2 Less than seven percent of all arrests of juveniles are
for crimes of violence.8 Despite these facts, a mythology has developed
* B.A., Hunter College; M.S., Purdue University; Executive Director, Florida
Center for Children and Youth, Tallahassee.
1. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 88 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CRIME 1982].
2. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 104 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CRIME 1978].
3. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
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which tells tales of "the rising tide" of youth crime. A perception that
our state and nation are in the midst of a juvenile crime wave is fueled
by shocking reports of isolated serious crimes perpetrated by young
persons. The justification for this perception is due in part to an actual
and significant rise in the crime rate of the eighteen to twenty-five year
old age group." The resultant outcry to "get tough on kids" has been
scattershot, however, and these calls for "toughness" have been misdi-
rected at a younger class of juveniles. It is helpful to look at the follow-
ing popular myths and the true facts concerning those issues:
Myth 1. The number of juvenile arrests is increasing and represents a
juvenile crime epidemic.
Fact: The number of juvenile arrests in Florida has declined twenty one
percent over the past five years, from 97,433 in 19788 to 76,381 in
1982.6
Myth 2. Florida's juvenile arrests account for a large and growing pro-
portion of total arrests.
Fact: Juvenile arrests account for a decreasing proportion of total ar-
rests. In 1978, juvenile arrests represented 25.8% of total arrests.7 In
1982, juvenile arrests accounted for 14.6% of total arrests.'
Myth 3. The number of juvenile arrests in Florida for violent crimes is
dramatically increasing.
Fact: The number of juvenile arrests for the four most serious violent
crimes (homicide, rape, armed robbery and aggravated assault) has
decreased approximately eighteen percent since 1979.9 These crimes
account for less than six percent of all juvenile arrests.10
Myth 4. Juvenile crime is increasing most significantly in Florida's ma-
jor metropolitan areas.
Fact: From the period of 1976 through 1982, juvenile arrests have de-
creased in each of the fifteen largest metropolitan counties of
4. Id. at 89.
5. CRIME 1978, supra note 2, at 105.
6. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
7. CRIME 1978, supra note 2, at 104.
8. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
9. FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 112 (1979).
10. CRIME 1982, supra note 1, at 88.
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Florida.11
The explanation for the significant decrease in delinquency refer-
rals over the past five years cannot be based on a demographic shift in
Florida's population. In fact, the number of juveniles aged four to sev-
enteen has not appreciably changed over this period.12 Amendments to
Florida's delinquency laws cannot be used as an explanation for the
decrease in crime since the decline in juvenile arrests has been steady
all through the years of numerous statutory changes. The 1981 legisla-
tive changes which increased the use of secure detention and escalated
the adult court transfer rate were preceded by a year of markedly de-
clining juvenile arrest rates." In actuality, the decrease of juvenile ar-
rests is a national trend. There has been a steady decrease in juvenile
arrests since 1974, attributable, in part, to a concomittant decline in
the national youth population."
Demographics aside, the year 1974 saw a significant effort at the
federal level, through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act,15 to decriminalize status offenses and place restrictions upon cer-
tain harsh treatments of minor juvenile offenders; for example, jailing
juveniles with adults. It may be argued that the improved juvenile
crime statistics are a result of a more enlightened approach to the han-
dling of less serious offenders. Growing emphasis on the prevention and
treatment of child abuse, and a recognition that status offenders are not
offenders but victims, may be the most significant explanations for the
declining juvenile crime rates nationwide.
III. Policy Directions in Juvenile Justice
It is the responsibility of elected officials in the executive, legisla-
tive and judicial branches of government to guarantee to the public
that policy and budgetary decisions in the realm of juvenile justice are
based upon fact, not myth. Florida's delinquency statute and the range
11. Id. at 106.
12. Compare FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC ScHooLs 2
(1980-81), with FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC ScHoois 2
(1976-77).
13. Compare FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 110
(1981), with FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIME IN FLORIDA 107 (1980).
14. B. Krisberg & I. Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile Justice 9 (June 9, 1982)
(unpublished manuscript from University of Minnesota).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
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of juvenile justice programming should reflect a clear view of the youth
crime issue, and project a clear vision of how to improve the system. In
October 1983, the Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting re-
leased a report which documents the strengths of Florida's juvenile jus-
tice system, and points to those areas which require reform.16 It em-
phasizes the relative cost-effectiveness of current delinquency services.
If heeded, the report can serve as an outstanding planning document
for all branches of government. What follows is a summary of Florida's
juvenile justice program with accompanying recommendations for
improvement.
A. Diversion Programs
In 1978, the Juvenile Alternative Services Project (JASP) was
piloted in three districts of the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS). The Juvenile Alternative Services Project is a
court diversion program which provides services and sanctions such as
arbitration, restitution, family counseling and community work service
to non-serious juvenile offenders. After initial evaluations reported less
than twenty percent recidivism,1 7 JASP has been expanded to serve all
eleven HRS districts. In 1982-83 16,000 clients were served, more than
300,000 hours of community work were performed, and restitution pay-
ments totaled over $228,000.18 The cost for providing JASP services
averages $170.00 per client, 9 whereas traditional judicial handling
costs average $1,000.00 per case.20
Notable criticisms of service-oriented diversion programs focus on
their "net-widening" aspect.21 It has been asserted that the volume of
offenders served by JASP-like programs does not represent true diver-
16. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET-
ING, THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE FLORIDA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A
MULTIAGENCY POLICY ANALYSIS (1983) [hereinafter cited as POLICY ANALYSIS].
17. HRS, RESEARCH REPORT No. 6816, EVALUATION OF THE JUVENILE ALTER-
NATIVE SERVICES PROJECT 30 (1981).
18. Telephone interview with Mr. Lee Stapp, HRS, Children, Youth and Fami-
lies Program Office (Aug. 1983).
19. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 7.
20. Id.
21. See T. BLOMBERG, Widening the Net: An Anomaly in the Evaluation of Di-
version Programs, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION (M. W. Klein
and K. S. Teilman, eds., 1979) and C. FRAZIER, P. RICHARDS & R. H. POTTER, Juve-
nile Diversion and Net Widening: Toward a Clarification of Assessment Strategies, in
42 HUMAN ORGANIZATION passim (1983).
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sion because these individuals would not routinely receive court atten-
tion due to the minor nature of their alleged offenses. Basic to this
criticism is the argument that ninety-five percent of all adolescents
commit delinquent acts but are not apprehended, receive no sanctions,
and eventually mature out of their misbehavior. Opponents of diversion
services argue that this method widens the net of arrests, brings unnec-
essary formality to the diversion process, and may actually serve to la-
bel the child as a delinquent without court adjudication.
Despite the proliferation of JASP, the judicial handling of
juveniles has steadily increased in Florida. From 1976, when approxi-
mately one-third of all juvenile delinquency referrals were brought to
court for adjudication, the rate increased to fifty-four percent in
1982.22 The phenomenon, brought about by increased filings by the
state attorneys, reflects a public perception that "nothing happens" to
youths who are arrested. Court processing is viewed as concrete evi-
dence that "something happens."
In order to establish the cost-effectiveness of Florida's diversion
programs, evaluative studies must be undertaken to determine if JASP
clients are truly being diverted and whether these youths would be sub-
jected to court processing if the diversion service did not exist. Judicial
handling should be reserved only for violent or chronically delinquent
youth. Because so few juveniles who come to court are such serious
offenders, it is more appropriate to substitute the dollars which now go
into the bulk of court processing with diagnostic services, special reme-
dial education, and employment training. By reducing the judicial han-
dling rate from fifty-four percent to thirty percent, the state could real-
ize a savings in excess of fifteen million dollars annually. This amount
could then be directed to a range of appropriate family support and
skills training services.
B. Detention Programs
Florida has the highest pre-adjudicatory juvenile detention rate in
the nation.2 3 During fiscal year 1982-83, 25,089 youths were admitted
to secure detention-over one-third of all delinquency referrals during
that period.2 ' The total average daily population in Florida's twenty
22. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 8.
23. Id.
24. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES PROGRAM OFFcE, HRS, DETENTION POP-
ULATION ANALYSIS (fiscal year 1982-83) [hereinafter cited as POPULATION ANALYSIS].
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regional detention centers was 1,016 in 1982-83, with an average
length of stay per child of 12.7 days.25 During that same time, over
400,000 child days were spent in secure detention. 2 Funding for secure
detention represents one-quarter of the state's total budget for delin-
quency services.27 Due to the detainees' pre-adjudicatory status, the de-
tention program is not intended to offer any treatment services, just
custodial care. The cost of this care totals $1,200 per child per
month.2
In 1981, the Florida Legislature amended section 39.032, Florida
Statutes, which governs the detention decisionmaking process. Under
current law, the criteria for admitting a child to detention excludes
only the first-time accused misdemeanant, and even that child may be
admitted if there are reasonable grounds to believe that he will fail to
appear at any hearing. 9 In addition, the role of law enforcement and
the state attorney in making the detention decision was significantly
broadened by the 1981 statutory change.30 This legislation was passed
in direct reaction to a change enacted in 1980 which had restricted the
use of detention. The 1980 criteria created a storm of protest from the
law enforcement community. Specific cases of juveniles who were ar-
rested for certain crimes but could not be detained caused enormous
frustration. The perspective that "these youths must learn a lesson by
being locked up" was heard statewide. The fact that detention is not to
be used as punishment, that due process prohibits the arresting officers
from assuming the role of judge, and that the "lesson" learned in de-
tention may not be corrective but, on the contrary, destructive were not
considered. The 1980 change was depicted to the 1981 legislature as
promoting criminal behavior yet the facts did not justify this depiction.
During the 1980-81 year, detention populations were reduced by
twenty percent without any significant negative effect.3 1 During that
period, the number of arrested juveniles who were released pending ad-
judication increased less than one half of one percent, rates of appear-
ance at scheduled hearings were equal to previous years, and total ar-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. FLA. DEP'T HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., PUBLIC HEARINGS MANUAL 79
(1983) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS MANUAL].
28. Id.
29. FLA. STAT. § 39.032 (1981).
30. Id.
31. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16.
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rests of juveniles dropped by ten thousand.32 According to the 1983
Governor's Office policy report:
[T]he 1980 detention criteria, which were designed primarily to re-
duce the detention rate for juveniles charged with victimless of-
fenses and minor property offenses, achieved their intended purpose
and should be considered a successful experiment in the effort to
increase the cost effectiveness (reduce the number detained without
increasing the juvenile crime rate) of detention practices. 33
After the criteria were expanded in 1981, the detention rate increased
forty percent.34 As a result, the need to expand existing centers and to
build new facilities has become a major fixed capital and operating
budget issue. The 1981-82 state budget contained $8,000,000 of fixed
capital for secure detention centers, and a biennial operating cost of
nearly $35,000,000. The 1983-84 operating budget for detention ser-
vices is $20,400,000 and an additional $2,500,000 for fiscal year 1984-
85 is being requested by HRS.3 5 Detention has become one of Florida's
major child-intensive growth industries.
Contrary to the intent of the federal Juvenile Justice Act of
1974,36 the clientele of Florida's secure detention centers now includes
a population of status offenders-youth who are held in contempt of
court for violating dependency orders. These orders stem from truancy,
runaway, or similar non-criminal behavior. Surveys of Florida's secure
detention centers during the past two years have revealed as many as
ten percent of those detained were status offenders serving specified
sentences by order of the court.3 These youths remain in detention
twice as long (24.8 days average) as the youths held pending delin-
quency hearings.38 Secure detention certainly curtails status offense be-
havior during the term of incarceration. The child cannot run through
the concrete block walls or steel doors, there are no parents to disobey,
and attendance at the detention school is mandatory. Such confine-
32. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 10-11.
34. Id. at 11.
35. FLA. DEP'T HEALTH & REHAB. SERV., SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET REQUEST 4
(fiscal year 1984-5).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
37. POPULATION ANALYSIS, supra note 24.
38. COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, FLA. HOUSE OF
REP., BILL ANALYSIS PCB 3 (relating to status offenders, 1983) [hereinafter BILL
ANALYSIS PCB 3].
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ment, however, operates to inflict harm by aggravating the complex
problems which gave rise to the original status offense behavior. Due to
family, school and court frustration, and the dearth of appropriate
treatment resources, incarceration has become the expedient option.
But detention of behaviorally dependent children is an expensive mis-
take, one which reduces the chances of resolving those children's real
problems.
An alternative to secure detention, the non-secure detention pro-
gram, has been established in each of the regions now served by a de-
tention center. Non-secure detention provides intensive supervision to
those youths who are in pre-hearing status at one-third the cost of se-
cure detention placement. These youths remain with their families, are
required to maintain regular school attendance, and adhere to defined
activity limitations. During 1982-83, 5,873 youths were placed in non-
secure detention status, averaging 364 youths on a daily basis. 9 The
success of this alternative to secure confinement is well documented.4 °
Most youths appear at their hearings and are not accused of additional
offenses in the interim. Due to budget constraints and a longer length
of stay required in non-secure status, 21.4 days versus 12.6 for secure,
the program continually operates at capacity.41
With minimal modification, the state should re-adopt the set of
detention criteria passed by the 1980 Florida Legislature which re-
stricted the use of secure incarceration while not presenting any signifi-
cant threat to the integrity of the court process. Currently the non-
secure detention program serves one-quarter of the total average daily
population of youth in detention status.42 The program should be ex-
panded to serve one-half of all detained youths as a cost effective alter-
native to secure confinement. This shift of resources would effect an
operating savings of some $5,000,000 in addition to removing the ne-
cessity for capital construction for expanded and new detention facili-
ties. The practice of utilizing secure detention as punishment for re-
peated status offense behavior should be curtailed. The fiscal cost of
this practice is overshadowed only by the human cost to the child. Ex-
pansion of well-staffed non-secure shelters at which behaviorally depen-
dent youth receive diagnostic and therapeutic services is the most cost-
39. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, KEY INDICATORS
REPORT (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as KEY INDICATORS REPORT].
40. Id.
41. POPULATION ANALYSIS, supra note 24.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
262 [Vol. 8
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effective alternative to detention incarceration.
C. Community Control
Community control is a court-ordered non-residential supervision
program. A youth is required to perform specified tasks such as com-
munity work service or payment of restitution and adhere to certain
behavior limitations such as observing curfews and attending school or
a job training program for a period of time designated by the court.
Failure to obey the community control order results in the commitment
of the child to HRS.4'3 Each year less than ten percent of the clients
supervised on community control have failed the program and received
commitment status. 4 During 1982-83, 22,320 youths received commu-
nity control sanctions at a per client cost of approximately $350. 45
Since 1980 the community work service and restitution compo-
nents of the program have been expanded. During 1982-83, more than
150,000 hours of community work service, and $500,000 of victim res-
titution payments were generated by community control clients. 4' The
program operates at a per client cost which averages one-tenth of the
costs of the residential program, a clearly cost effective alternative.
The community control program's direction toward expansion of
work service and restitution should be continued. The caseworker's role
in this regard should involve creative involvement with the private busi-
ness sector in each community. Employment skills training, job devel-
opment and placement services should become primary functions of the
community control program so that clients can achieve economic and
personal success when their supervision is completed.
D. Commitment
The percentage of juveniles who are committed by the court to
HRS for treatment services is eight percent of all youths who are re-
ferred to HRS for alleged delinquency. 47 This is double the commit-
ment percentage of five years ago.' 8 Since the early 1970s the array of
43. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 12.
44. Id.
45. Telephone interview with Mr. Dix Darnell, Department of Health and Reha-
bilitative Services, Children, Youth and Families Program Office (Nov. 1983).
46. Id.
47. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 15.
48. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16 at 25.
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programs available as commitment options has expanded to a remarka-
ble degree. Fifteen years ago all youths committed for treatment in
Florida were sent to training schools." In 1982, training schools admit-
ted approximately thirty-two percent of all committed youth.50 The re-
maining two-thirds were served by numerous alternative programs
ranging from non-residential special intensive groups and marine sci-
ence institutes to residential wilderness programs, halfway houses,
group treatment homes, and START centers.51 During 1982-83, ap-
proximately 3,200 youths were committed to community alternative de-
linquency programs. These youths were served at less cost and with a
higher degree of success than those committed to training schools.5 2
Florida operates three training schools: the A.G. Dozier School in
Marianna, the A.D. McPherson School in Ocala, and the Florida
School for Boys in Okeechobee. The latter institution is operated by the
Jack and Ruth Eckerd Foundation under contract with the state. Dur-
ing 1982-83, the training schools housed a total average daily popula-
tion of 1,016 youths. 53 The average population over the third quarter of
1983 has been reduced to approximately 850 per day." The cost per
client of an average six-month stay in training school is $6,280.15 Al-
though training schools are perceived to be the "deep end" of the juve-
nile justice system, housing only serious offenders who have been
through numerous other programs without success, statistics point to a
different reality.
Over the past three years, as many as forty-five percent of training
school admittees were youths who had never received treatment in an
alternative program.56 Currently, one-third of training school clients
are first commitments.57 Fewer than fifteen percent of the juveniles in
training schools have been committed for violent offenses.58 Three-
fourths of them are not significantly different in terms of commitment
49. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, COMMITMENT PRO-
GRAM DATA ANALYSIS (1982).
50. HRS, CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, STATISTICAL PACKAGE (1982).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. KEY INDICATORS REPORT, supra note 39.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, HRS, COMMITMENT PRO-
GRAM DATA ANALYSIS (1982).
57. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 24.
58. Id. at 16.
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offenses and offense histories from those juveniles who are placed in
community programs.59 Although state policy prohibits the placement
of misdemeanants in a training school, waiver of this policy occurred
over a hundred times during 1981-82.60 This evidence points to the ran-
domness of placement practices which are more dependent on space
availability than on an individual client's history or specialized need.
The 1983-84 training school operating budget is $12,800,000.61
Unfortunately, little of this expenditure relates to appropriate mental
health services or even basic supervision. Psychologists' caseloads are at
a 1:200 ratio and general supervision is the responsibility of cottage
parents who earn less than $9,000 annually.62 Additionally, the history
of treatment in the training schools has not been the provision of care
"which will best serve the moral, emotional, mental and physical wel-
fare of the child."6 3 Corporal punishment was a prevalent practice until
its use was discontinued in the mid 1970s. Physical beating to discipline
children who have often been victims of child abuse over much of their
lives serves neither the client nor the program. To create a system of
violent punishment is tantamount to ignoring all but the toughest cli-
ents. The dilemma of training schools is whether rehabilitation will
ever be feasible in an environment that houses four hundred youths in a
rural setting which completely cuts off the realities of home and com-
munity.6 4 Nearly half of training school clients are age fifteen or
younger. Housing several hundred young adolescents in a closed envi-
ronment serves only to exacerbate emotional disturbance and to pro-
mote violent behavior.
Clear distinctions must be made between the treatment needs of
serious violent youth offenders and less-serious committed youth. De-
partmental screening procedures should be developed which diagnose
those youths with special needs such as emotional disturbances and de-
velopmental disability. Appropriate treatment resources should exist for
these individuals. Violent and repeat offenders, who represent less than
fifteen percent of all youths committed by the court, should receive in-
59. Id.
60. Letter from Melvin Herring of HRS Children, Youth, & Family Office to
author (Sept. 1982).
61. HEARINGS MANUAL, supra note 27, at 45.
62. SELECT COMM. ON Juv. JUSTICE, FLA. HOUSE OF REP., OVERSIGHT REPORT
ON FLORIDA'S TRAINING SCHOOLS 48 (1981).
63. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(2)(c) (1981).
64. HRS, CHILDREN, FAMILIES & YOUTH PROGRAM OFFICE, STATISTICAL PACK-
AGE (fiscal year 1981-82).
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tensive therapeutic treatment in relatively small, secure programs of
twenty-five to thirty beds. If proper client evaluation and specialized
treatment services were available, large training schools would become
an unnecessary component of the delinquency program.
E. Adult Correctional Admissions
Since 1978, the number of juveniles admitted to adult prisons has
tripled from 257 in 1977-78 to 771 in 1981-82.11 Of the 771 juvenile
admissions in 1981-82, forty percent were aged sixteen or younger. 6
Statutory changes enacted in 1981 permit the transfer of sixteen and
seventeen year-olds for criminal prosecution as adults at the discretion
of the state attorney.67 The sole criterion for this transfer is a felony
charge; no prior record needs to be in evidence.68 Although it is as-
sumed that adult court transfer should be limited only to those
juveniles who are accused of violent crimes or have proven themselves
not amenable to juvenile court handling, the statutes do not set such
limitations on prosecutorial discretion. Under current law, a sixteen
year-old accused of grand larceny (theft of property valued at $100 or
more) may be tried as an adult, subjected to six months in jail pending
trial, and be incarcerated in the adult prison system if found guilty.69
Of the juveniles sentenced to the Florida Department of Correc-
tions in 1981-82, twenty-five percent had no prior arrests on record.
The median sentence for these juveniles was three years with a major-
ity of them having been found guilty of non-violent property offenses.70
Burglary accounted for forty-four percent of these commitments.7 1 By
placing a sixteen year-old burglar in prison for three years, the state
pays an initial $30,000 installment on a long-term debt. According to
the Youthful Offender Program Evaluation, these inmates are fre-
quently the target of severe exploitation and abuse by older, stronger
inmates.7 Prison, especially for the young, is a violent environment in
which the powerful prey upon the weak. A victimized offender cannot
65. Id.
66. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 25.
67. FLA. STAT. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (1981).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 25.
71. Id.
72. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET,
YOUTHFUL OFFENDER PROGRAM EVALUATION (1981).
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be rehabilitated, and our prisons are producing hundreds of youthful
victims each year who will return to their communities worse off than
they were before being sent away.
The authority to transfer a juvenile to criminal court should be a
judge's decision, after the facts have been presented in a waiver hear-
ing. The waiver process should only be utilized for those juveniles who
commit serious crimes or whose records indicate that previous attempts
at juvenile court sanctions have failed. The Department of Corrections
should develop specialized programs which emphasize vocational train-
ing for juvenile inmates ages seventeen and under. No inmate who is
diagnosed as developmentally disabled or mentally ill should be incar-
cerated in mainstream prison environments.
IV. Juvenile Justice and the Educational System
In examining the problems of youth who enter the juvenile justice
system, the role of the school cannot be ignored. Sporadic attendance,
misbehavior and educational failure are all characteristics of young
people who get into trouble with the law. Although schools are respon-
sible for the enforcement of compulsory attendance laws, few school
districts in Florida have effective programs to respond to the complex
reasons for a student's non-attendance or misbehavior. The misbe-
having child is viewed by school administrators as a discipline problem
who requires punishment. In the 1981-82 school year, over 180,000
public school students in Florida received corporal punishment on sin-
gle or numerous occasions.73 Actual incidents of corporal punishment
may number a half million or million annually. In the 1981-82 school
year, over 83,000 Florida students were suspended from public school.74
In the 1980-81 school year, over 40,000 students dropped out of Flor-
ida's public schools,75 and another 112,000 were not promoted to the
next highest grade.78 Each year, for every two graduates of Florida's
schools, a third child is a dropout.
The discipline statistics are especially severe for black students. In
the 1980-81 school year, black students comprised twenty-three percent
of the Florida public school population but represented thirty-three per-
cent of the non-promoted students, thirty-seven percent of the corpo-
73. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 29 (1981-2).
74. FLA. DEP'T OF EDUC., STUDENTS IN FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 28 (1981-2).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 24.
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rally punished students, thirty-eight percent of the suspended students
and forty-three percent of the expelled students.77 In 1979, the federal
Office of Civil Rights released a study which ranked the nation's one
hundred worst school districts for overrepresentation of black students
among those who were corporally punished, suspended or expelled. Ten
Florida school districts were among those one hundred. These districts
are ten of the twelve largest Florida school districts, encompassing
nearly sixty percent of the state's public school population.7 8
The Florida Alternative Education Act was established in 1978 to
promote educational services which are "positive not punitive" and are
directed to provide special help to the disruptive and unsuccessful stu-
dent.7 9 A majority of Florida's school districts have implemented alter-
native education programs. An evaluation of these programs by the
Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting in 1981 revealed that
most district programs offered little in the way of specialized instruc-
tion or support services. 80 The majority of districts operated in-school
suspension and detention programs, without any cooperative planning
within districts, across districts, or with the Department of Education.,
Without the proper implementation of the Alternative Education Act,
the punitive and exclusionary practices of Florida's public schools have
continued to generate drop-out rates and a population of under-edu-
cated, unskilled, frustrated and desperate young people. Additionally,
the 1983 Florida Legislature's initiative in passing the RAISE Bill,
aimed at making graduation requirements more stringent, may result
in even higher drop-out rates. RAISE ignores the special needs of a
large population of students who are failing under current educational
standards.
After five years, the Alternative Education Act should begin to
show a positive impact on exclusionary discipline practices. To that
end, clear performance measures for district alternative education pro-
grams should be developed by the Department of Education and uti-
lized for evaluation purposes. The practices of corporal punishment and
suspension should be limited by statutory amendment. It is not in the
77. Id.
78. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE,
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY (appendix and tables,
1979).
79. FLA. STAT. § 230.2315 (1981).
80. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET,
ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION: AN EVALUATION (1981).
81. Id.
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best interest of either the child, the school, or the state to continue to
over-utilize these ineffective punishment methods. The emphasis of the
RAISE improvements should be expanded to include increased coun-
seling and guidance services and expanded remedial education compo-
nents. Unamended, the RAISE initiative will result in higher drop-out
rates than presently exist. An enhanced career education program
should be developed utilizing the technical expertise of private business
and community agencies to promote improved job training and employ-
ment opportunities for Florida's student population.
V. Conclusion
The purpose of Florida's juvenile justice system is appropriately
stated in section 39.001, Florida Statutes, as the intent "to protect soci-
ety more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, when-
ever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation. . . which are consis-
tent with the seriousness of the offense .... ,,82 This state has
established, through statutes and programs, a proper framework for the
achievement of that rehabilitative purpose. Certain needed adjust-
ments, such as those suggested in this article, would bring our system
more expediently toward this rehabilitative goal.
82. FLA. STAT. § 39.001 (1979).
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